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3.1  Introduction 
The extent and detail of state regulatory control over the auto insurance in- 
dustry has increased markedly in the past 10 years.’ In many cases, this change 
in the regulatory environment has come about as a consequence of  well- 
organized, grass-roots consumer activism. The passage of California’s Proposi- 
tion 103, a voter initiative that, among other provisions, enacted a rollback of 
insurance premium rates and a limit on the actuarial information that could be 
used in setting these rates, is a case in point. Proposition 103, however, is by 
no means unique; following its passage in November 1988, 44 states consid- 
ered similar regulatory changes, and similar legislation passed in the states of 
Nevada, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania (see Rosenfield 1991). 
These “populist” moves to regulate auto insurance rates are based on the 
view that the insurance industry uses “unfair and discriminatory pricing prac- 
tices.”* Two forms of  regulation have been imposed. One form restricts the 
factors that insurance companies are allowed to use in defining risk catego- 
ries-this  is called rate compression. A second form restricts either the overall 
level of premiums or the rates applied to particular categories-this  is called 
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rate suppression; see Harrington (1992) for a discussion of this term. We use 
the term rate regulation to refer to compression and suppression together. 
Rate compression is illustrated by California’s Proposition 103, which stipu- 
lates that, without the additional approval of the insurance commissioner, pas- 
senger automobile insurance rates may apply only the following three factors: 
1. The insured‘s driving record 
2.  The number of miles driven annually 
3.  The number of years of driving experience 
Such characteristics as the driver’s place of  residence, age, sex, and marital 
status could no longer be used without the approval of the insurance commis- 
sioner. These factors were frequently used by insurance companies prior to the 
passage of Proposition 103.3 
Rate suppression is used in Massachusetts, where premiums in many catego- 
ries are explicitly set below the actuarial cost-a  system called tempering. 
Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1991) report that in Massachusetts, expected costs 
vary across drivers by a factor of 4.4, but premiums vary by only a factor of 3. 
Expected costs vary across territories by a factor of 2.7, but premiums vary by 
only a factor of 2. 
Insurance companies, of course, have an incentive to reject customers who 
must be charged suppressed rates. Since auto insurance is mandatory in all 
states, rejected customers still need insurance, which is generally provided 
through assigned risk pools. Drivers who are denied auto policies are placed 
in the assigned risk pool and charged premiums that may be below the actuarial 
costs. Each auto insurance company in the state is then required to take a share 
of the assigned risk pool equal to its share of the overall market.4 
Standard welfare economics provides no simple explanation for regulatory 
pressures in this market. There are two factors that may work in the direction 
of welfare enhancement. First, in a world of imperfect information and costly 
sorting, rate compression could work to curtail a tendency to form (socially) 
too many risk categories. Second, by  lowering premiums, rate suppression 
could induce previously uninsured drivers to purchase coverage, thus eliminat- 
ing externalities associated with uninsured motorists. On the other hand, as 
with any cross-subsidization  scheme, there are obvious welfare losses associ- 
ated with rate regulation. Drivers who are charged premiums above their true 
costs will underconsume driving, auto insurance, or both, and vice versa. The 
net welfare effect of regulation is thus far from clear. 
Given this, we raise the question, Why has the auto insurance industry 
emerged as a primary target for increased regulation? The main goal of this 
paper is to try to answer this question by linking the possible sources and con- 
3. A California Department of Insurance (1978) study noted that every insurance company in 
California that wrote automobile liability insurance in  1978 used place of  residence in setting 
its rates. 
4.  Assigned risk plans differ across states in the details of their operation, but the general princi- 
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sequences of rate regulation. The agenda of the paper is the following. Section 
3.2 develops the economics of auto insurance for an unregulated industry. Sec- 
tion 3.3 outlines the details of Proposition 103. Section 3.4 explores the various 
sources of  demand for rate regulation, including the populist sentiments al- 
ready mentioned. Section 3.5 looks at the economic effects of rate regulation. 
Section 3.6 provides empirical results that evaluate the welfare effects of auto 
insurance regulation. Section 3.7 provides corresponding empirical results 
concerning the voting record on Proposition 103. Section 3.8 provides conclu- 
sions and topics for future consideration. 
3.2  Structure of an Unregulated Insurance Industry 
To  understand the reasons for the success of  the proregulation movement 
and to provide a benchmark from which to evaluate the consequences  of regu- 
lation, it is useful to examine how the auto insurance industry in California 
operated before the passage of Proposition 103. Even before Proposition 103, 
the state insurance commissioner had the duty to ensure that insurance rates 
were “neither excessive nor inadequate,” but as noted by Sugarman (1990), this 
price control authority was rarely used. Once the commissioner found that the 
market was competitive, the inquiry into excessive rates ended. Rather remark- 
ably (at least for economists),  Proposition 103 expressly states that with regard 
to excessive rates, “no consideration shall be given to the degree of competi- 
ti~n.”~  Assume then that prior to the passage of Proposition 103,  auto insurance 
in the state of California was, in essence, an unregulated competitive industry. 
How does such an industry operate? 
In the first wave of economic analysis of this question,  Anow (1963), Borch 
(1990), and Malinvaud (1972) showed that if  sellers of  insurance have full 
information regarding the risk class of each insured, then a competitive indus- 
try,  given zero administrative costs and a large number of  risks in each risk 
class, would offer an array of insurance contracts, one for each risk class, the 
premium on each contract being set so that each contract earned zero profits 
on average. Buyers of  insurance, given that they act to maximize expected 
utility, would then fully insure at the actuarially fair odds appropriate to their 
risk classes. 
This early analysis was followed by the seminal contribution of Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976), who noted that the assumption of full information regard- 
ing individual risk does not hold in many insurance markets. Often the buyers 
of insurance have more information regarding the risk of loss than do the sell- 
ers. Rothschild and Stiglitz showed that in this case, the resulting adverse se- 
lection may prevent the market from having an equilibrium (in the Nash sense). 
When an equilibrium does exist it will separate the high-risk and low-risk buy- 
ers, with the low-risk buyers facing quantity rationing. 
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The equilibrium concept was  subsequently refined by  Miyazaki (1977), 
Riley (1979), and Wilson (1977), who assumed that sellers anticipate the reac- 
tions of  other sellers when adding or deleting new contracts. These models 
identify a set of  reaction functions under which equilibrium always exists, 
and  the  equilibrium structure may  have  either  separating contracts, as in 
Rothschild-Stiglitz, or a single pooled contract for all buyers. 
These authors were all concerned with characterizing equilibrium in a one- 
period model of  the industry. When the industry deals with customers in a 
multiperiod setting, there are a number of additional methods for dealing with 
the problem of adverse selection.  Cooper and Hayes (1987), for example, noted 
that it is possible to design a contract pair (a single period contract and a 
multiperiod contract in which the premium falls over time) so that only low- 
risk individuals buy the multiperiod contract. Thus, this contract pair solves 
the adverse selection problem. 
Kunreuther and Pauly (1985), on the other hand, note that over time an in- 
surance company obtains private information regarding a driver’s riskiness. In- 
surance companies may then underprice policies in the first year of a contract 
because this provides them the option to renew good customers at favorable 
rates in later years. In the following years, the companies may increase premi- 
ums even to those drivers whose records show them to be of low risk, given 
the transaction costs these drivers would face in  switching companies. This 
model thus predicts the opposite dynamic pricing structure from that predicted 
by Cooper and Hayes, since here the insured faces a premium structure that is 
predicted to rise over time. See D’Arcy and Doherty (1990) for a fuller discus- 
sion of this issue. 
The existence of equilibrium is also made problematic by the presence of 
moral hazard. In a monopolistic setting, multiperiod contracts designed by 
Radner (1985) to deal with moral hazard in labor markets and extended to 
insurance markets by Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) could deal with this prob- 
lem. However, these contracts cannot be offered competitively. The issues of 
adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  are  surveyed in  Dionne and  Doherty 
(1992). 
Relative to the large body of theoretical work giving possible equilibrium 
structures for this industry, the amount of  empirical work describing actual 
equilibrium is rather small. Dahlby (1983) provides evidence of adverse selec- 
tion, and D’Arcy and Doherty (1990) provide evidence that seasoned custom- 
ers generate quasi rents. More recently, Puelz and Snow (1994), in a study of 
contract structures offered by an insurance company in Georgia, demonstrated 
the existence of  quantity rationing of  good risks, and Dionne and Doherty 
(1994) used California data to test the commitment strategies of auto insurance 
companies. However, such features as quantity rationing of good risks, multi- 
year contracts, and price increases to good customers do not seem to be any 
part of the rhetoric of those who wish to limit market competition. 
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have not received much attention from theorists. Since these features may be 
relevant to the industry’s vulnerability to regulatory attacks, we now set out a 
stylized structure designed to capture the essence of the way in which the in- 
dustry actually operated before regulation. We concentrate on four features of 
this stylized equilibrium. 
1. Recognizing the fact that individuals belong to different risk classes, each 
firm in the industry set up a large number of information cells and collected 
data on the loss experience in each cell. These cells were largely standard- 
ized across the industry, with little variation from firm to firm. (An example 
of  a cell might be a 50-year-old married man who drives a 1990 Volvo 
and lives in San Francisco.) The standardization of cells was coordinated 
through an industry data collection agency (such as the Insurance Service 
Office) and presumably arose as a consequence of  economies of  scale in 
data collection and analysis. 
Industry standardization of the classification scheme can be motivated by 
at least two factors. First, firms that attempt to introduce new rating classes 
will face the costs of obtaining and applying the new information. But they 
are unlikely to obtain a competitive edge from the innovation since other 
firms can costlessly observe and apply the innovator’s premium structure. 
Second, standardization may  be an important mechanism through which 
the industry helps protect itself against individual firms offering new con- 
tracts that attempt to “cream-skim” customers. 
2. Since each cell had an associated loss experience, the insurance company 
could then statistically determine a loss relative for each cell and from this 
could determine a cell-specific premium. (A useful summary of the statisti- 
cal methods used to determine loss relatives is given by  Jee  1989). It is 
clear, however, that within any cell there are individuals whose risk is mis- 
classified in the sense that their true risk of accident lies above or below the 
estimated risk for their cell. This was treated by each firm as a fact of life. 
In particular, direct quantity rationing was not used to induce individuals to 
self-select the appropriate risk 
3. Although it is possible to associate a competitive risk premium with each 
cell, in fact firms did not write an insurance contract for each cell. Even 
before regulation of  prices, firms in the insurance industry engaged in a 
system of voluntary rationing and “risk tiering.” It is easiest to describe how 
this system worked by example. 
Suppose that an individual applied for auto insurance at a major automo- 
bile insurance company. Three events could occur: 
a.  If  the individual fell into a high enough loss ratio cell (say because of 
multiple moving violations), the insurance company simply refused to 
6. Of course, insurance companies used deductible limits and other forms of nonlinear pricing, 
but it appears to us that these reflected cost considerations and were not used to induce individuals 
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4. 
write a policy and instead placed the individual in the involuntary as- 
signed risk pool. 
b.  If the individual fell into a cell with a loss ratio below that which led to 
outright rejection of the risk but was still at the high end of the loss ratio 
(say because of  one moving violation), the insurance company would 
not write a policy in its own name but would issue a policy through a 
wholly owned subsidiary that handled only high-risk drivers. This tier of 
insurance is called “nonstandard insurance.” 
c.  If the individual fell into a low enough risk cell, the insurance company 
would then write a policy in its own name. This is called “standard in- 
surance.” 
The existence of  this three-tier structure is not easy to understand in 
terms of  standard economic theory. Risk tiering, however, has been ob- 
served in other industries (e.g., banks do not  make high-risk consumer 
loans), and in the case of  credit markets Jaffee and Russell (1992) argue 
that risk tiering is a market response to concerns of fairness. We  wiJl exam- 
ine this question of fairness later when we examine the reasons for regu- 
lation. 
Insurance companies, in general, did not issue multiyear contracts. There 
was some limited experience  rating, good drivers in some cases being given 
discounts, but insurance contracts offering a menu of premium terms based 
on the length of the contract do not seem to have been offered. 
3.3  Regulation in California: Proposition 103 
Proposition  103 was  (narrowly) passed to regulate an industry with the 
above structure. The immediate impetus for the initiative seems to have been 
twofold, partly concern with the large rate of premium increases in the years 
prior to 1988 and partly concern with the large disparity in premiums among 
individuals with prima facie similar risk characteristics. (E.g., individuals liv- 
ing on opposite sides of a street could have auto premiums that differed by a 
factor of 2.0; see Williams 1992.) 





All insurance rates were to be rolled back 20 percent from the rates holding 
on 8 November 1987. 
All future rate changes were to be approved by the insurance commissioner, 
who was now to be elected, not appointed. 
Only very specific factors could be used in setting risk classes. These were 
to be (in order of importance): 
i. The insured’s driving record 
ii. The number of miles driven annually 
iii. The number of years of driving experience 87  Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry 
Other factors could be used, if approved, but less weight must be given than 
to the first three factors. 
d. Insurance companies were required to accept all “good drivers” who ap- 
plied for insurance, where “good driver” was defined as a driver having no 
more than one moving violation in the past three years. In addition all “good 
drivers” were to be offered a “good driver” discount. 
With many of these provisions now in place, it is no longer possible to view 
the insurance industry in California as providing a competitive solution to the 
problem of risk allocation. What was it about the competitive solution outlined 
above that so upset the California voters? We  turn now to an analysis of the 
possible causes of insurance market regulation. 
3.4  Why Insurance Contracts Provoke Regulatory Action 
There are many possible reasons why auto insurance has become the target 
of  consumer-based regulatory movements. Perceived  self-interest, for  ex- 
ample, may lead to a call for rollbacks and rate ceilings, since consumers may 
think that premium ceilings can create lower prices with unchanged supply. 
Why insurance, though, and not, say, beer? The absence of  a grass-roots 
consumer movement calling for a rollback in the price of beer (and most other 
goods) suggests that consumers recognize that the deadweight costs of price 
regulation generally exceed the benefits of such regulation. It thus remains an 
important question why automobile  insurance has been singled out for such at- 
tention. 
Our analysis considers three main sets of explanations for consumer initia- 
tives that create rate regulation. The first set uses considerations of distribu- 
tionaE equity to motivate rate regulation as a means of achieving risk sharing 
or income redistribution for risk-averse individuals. The second set is based on 
the welfare enhancement that may arise from rate regulation in insurance mod- 
els such as the type developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and its exten- 
sions. The third set is based on concepts offairness in response to the percep- 
tion of unfair and discriminatory practices in insurance premium setting. 
3.4.1  Distributional Equity 
In their recent study, Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1991; BZ) consider mo- 
tives based on distributional  equity that might cause risk-averse individuals to 
accept the deadweight losses created by rate regulation. We  summarize here 
their arguments concerning the risk-sharing and income redistribution motives 
that would be relevant to risk-averse individuals. 
Risk Sharing 
Suppose, for simplicity,  that each driver’s risk of an auto accident belongs to 
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(t  = 0), drivers are assumed to be in a Rawlsian state of ignorance about their 
true classes. At a later date (t = 1), insurance markets open and each driver’s 
risk is revealed to both the driver and the market. In the absence of deadweight 
loss, all risk-averse drivers would vote at t =  0 to force insurance firms at t = 1 to 
charge only a single premium rate, reflecting the average risk of the population. 
Using a similar argument, drivers might resist any form of categorization 
because it introduces a classification risk. That is, consumers may prefer to 
have premiums based on the community’s average risk, instead of  entering 
what they may think of as a classification lottery to determine whether they are 
to be treated as high risk or’ low risk. The argument is particularly forceful if 
consumers do not know their risk classes initially but are provided estimates 
of them through the categorization process. 
BZ estimate the deadweight loss and compute the coefficient of risk aversion 
required to cause individuals to support single-class contracts in the face of 
this loss. They reject the risk-class uncertainty hypothesis on the basis of the 
unrealistically high risk aversion coefficient that is required to generate the 
amount of tempering observed in Massachusetts. However, we should recog- 
nize that Massachusetts has perhaps the greatest degree of tempering of auto 
insurance rates in the United States. Also BZ estimate a relatively high price 
elasticity of demand, which magnifies the deadweight loss of rate regulation. 
On the other hand, the existence of bans on the use of  certain immutable 
characteristics, for example, gender, in the setting of auto insurance rates pro- 
vides support for the Rawlsian argument. In a Rawlsian state of  ignorance, 
individuals would not know their genders, and the adoption of this moral refer- 
ence point would explain their desire that insurance rates be blind to immut- 
able chakacteristics. 
Income Redistribution 
Individuals may use rate suppression as a means to redistribute income. Ob- 
viously, if insurance is offered at the same rate to individuals with objectively 
different risks of accident, the high-risk individuals will be subsidized by the 
low-risk individuals. This in turn will generate income distribution from low- 
risk (presumably high-income) to high-risk (presumably low-income) drivers. 
Citizens could desire this income redistribution for its own sake. 
BZ, however, again reject the income redistribution hypothesis on the basis 
of the high level of deadweight loss. It should be noted that in Massachusetts 
rate regulation was imposed by the insurance commissioner, who presumably 
was responsible for evaluating the trade-off between the income distribution 
benefits and the deadweight costs. In the context of voter initiative states such 
as California, however, it is not clear to what extent this deadweight loss enters 
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3.4.2  Welfare Enhancement 
It is possible that the move to regulate the insurance market was motivated 
by  a desire to remove observed inefficiencies in the unregulated market. The 
consumer activists who pressed for regulation, however, did not document 
such inefficiencies, instead arguing that regulation was necessary to improve 
the fairness of the pricing structure. 
Of  course, it is still possible that as a “side effect” of fairness-led reform, 
the market could become more efficient. Since welfare enhancement was not 
the primary motive for regulation, however, we postpone a discussion of the 
efficiency aspects of  rate regulation to the section dealing with the conse- 
quences of regulation. We turn now to the central argument used by the proreg- 
ulation camp, the view that auto insurance rates were unfair. 
3.4.3  Fairness 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) have documented that consumers 
have a well-developed sense of when a price is or is not fair. As a consequence, 
these authors argue that considerations of fairness will limit price dispersion 
when the price dispersion has no obvious basis in differential costs.’ 
This argument clearly has relevance to the types of regulation that we ob- 
serve in auto insurance. Suppose perceived costs to a buyer of insurance are 
gauged by actual accident  costs. Since most insurance  buyers have no accidents 
in any given year, most buyers will perceive themselves as imposing the same 
costs on insurance companies. Yet  drivers in different risk classes may face 
very different prices. 
For example, ih Los Angeles County, in the five-year period 1983-88, the 
frequency of claims for bodily injury liability was 2.4 times the statewide aver- 
age for these claims (National  Association of Independent Insurers 1988).  Yet 
in this five-year period, the actual total of incurred claims in  Los Angeles 
County was 71,890 on an “installed base” of 1,464,079  autos. Thus 95 percent 
of all insured automobiles in Los Angeles County had no claims in five years. 
Nevertheless, these Los Angeles County drivers faced insurance premiums 
about 2.4 times as high as the state average. 
The inherent concerns for fairness raised by the pricing structure of a com- 
petitive insurance industry are exacerbated by the following considerations: 
1.  In the years before Proposition 103, private passenger auto insurance 
rates in the state grew very fast (National Association of Insurance Commis- 
sioners 1988)? 
7. When we use the word  “fairness” we should stress that  we mean “perceived fairness.” As 
economists, we are not endorsing these reported dimensions of fairness as being in any  welfare 
sense fair or just. 
8. Rapid growth in auto insurance fraud may be  one explanation for the rapidly rising premiums. 
It  has been suggested that  the companies took action to control fraud following the passage of 
Proposition 103, with the result that their claim losses fell. 90  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell 















To the extent that consumers use a historical premium as a reference point for 
calculating a fair premium, and again remembering that most drivers would 
have no claims in this six-year period, this doubling of premiums seems likely 
to contribute to the sense of unfairness. 
2.  Returning to the question of fairness across risk categories, in any risk 
cell there will be some drivers who are misclassified simply because statistical 
procedures are designed to classify risk on average. Again remembering that a 
small difference in loss relative, say 1.2 rather than 1, translates into a 20 per- 
cent difference in premium, misclassified drivers may well feel aggrieved. 
3. In  addition to objectively legitimate concerns about misclassification, 
there is also the Lake Wobegone effect. Recall that in mythical Lake Wobe- 
gone every student is above average. If  every driver believes himself to be 
above average, he will vote to be placed in a lower risk pool, and this can lead 
to rate compression. 
4. Classification based on immutable characteristics or characteristics that 
are correlated but not causative will also increase concern. Individuals may 
feel that immutable characteristics  such as gender ought not to be used as crite- 
ria for price discrimination.  Similarly, when the classification factor is correla- 
tive but not causative, for example, zip code as opposed to years of  driving 
experience, concerns about fairness may be heightened. 
Further evidence on consumers’ views of the fairness of insurance premiums 
is given by a GallupOrganization poll of 1,000 consumers conducted in 1990. 
The results of this poll are shown in table 3.1. 
As can be seen, in this poll, which focused specifically on the fairness of 
premiums, 65 percent of consumers thought that property-casualty insurance 
companies overcharged, and 6 1 percent of consumers thought that property- 
casualty insurance companies were more profitable than companies in other 
industries. This suggests that issues of fairness in the Kahneman et al. (1986) 
sense could easily contribute to an explanation of both the rollback and rate 
compression features of Proposition 103. Whatever the motivation, of  course, 
once these regulations are in place they will have more standard welfare impli- 
cations. We turn now to an examination of these welfare effects. 91  Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry 
Table 3.1  Consumer Sentiment and the Auto Insurance Industry 
Total 
(n = 1,OOO)  The insurance industry achieves its profits by. . . 
Overcharging for premiums  65% 
Charging fair and adequate premiums and investing and managing this money 
wisely  26 
4 
Don't  know  5 
Undercharging for premiums but making up the difference through investments 
Companies that sell auto, homeowners, and  Total  Male  Female 
business insurance are . .  .  (n = 1,OOO)  (n = 490)  (n = 510) 
Just as profitable as the companies in most other 
industries  28%  21%  34% 
Less profitable than the companies in most other 
industries  5  5  5 
More profitable than the companies in most other 
industries  61  71  52 
Don't know  6  3  9 
Total (n  = 1,000) 
Insurance companies that sell 
auto, homeowners, and  Strongly  Strongly  Mean 
business insurance. .  .  Agree  Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Rating" 
Make a killing, but pretend 
Make a fair profit after 
Make very little becawe their 
they are not making money  5%  32%  25%  5%  2.99 
expenses and loss payments  22  48  16  11  2.84 
losses are always going up  2  8  48  39  1.73 
Source: Best's Review: Property-Casualty Insurance Edition 91, no.  1 (May 1990): 16. 
=4  = strongly agree, 3 = agree, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly disagree. 
3.5  Rate Regulation, Efficiency, and Welfare 
The  welfare  economics  literature for  insurance markets has  expanded 
greatly in recent years, partly reflecting fundamental advances in information 
economics, and partly reflecting attempts to apply economic analysis to the 
current political issues in insurance markets. Our primary goal is to identify 
the results that are applicable to auto insurance markets. 
In most competitive industries:  regulation of  prices or quantities reduces 
efficiency. The auto insurance industry, however, has at least two special fea- 
tures requiring special attention. 
1.  By its nature, the automobile insurance industry uses actuarial informa- 
tion to sort individuals into risk classes. Since Spence (1973), it has been 
9. Because so many features  of the automobile insurance  industry seem compatible  with compe- 
tition, we will proceed on this premise. 92  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell 
known that private and social incentives to sort do not always coincide. There 
is thus room for rate compression to be welfare enhancing. 
2.  In many states a large number of drivers do not purchase auto insurance. 
(E.g., some estimates suggest that as many as 30 percent of the drivers in Cali- 
fornia do not insure.) If  price rollbacks induce noninsured motoGsts to buy 
insurance, rate suppression may be welfare enhancing (see Smith and Wright 
1992). We now discuss each of these cases in turn. 
3.5.1 
There is now an extensive literature dealing with the welfare economics of 
risk classification in insurance markets. Important contributions include Bond 
and Crocker (1991), Crocker and Snow (1986), Hoy (1989), Puelz and Kemm- 
sies (1993), and Rea (1992). There are also excellent summaries by Borenstein 
(1989) and Harrington (1993). 
Rather than discuss this literature in detail, we simply state the fundamental 
conclusion. In a competitive market, the decision whether to introduce a new 
risk class is based solely on a calculation of the costs and benefits to the poten- 
tial members of this new class. A proper accounting for social welfare, how- 
ever, should take into account not just the welfare of the members of the new 
class but also the welfare of the remainder of the population who do not join 
the new class. It is very easy, see Borenstein (1989), to construct examples of 
costly sorting in which introducing a new risk class increases the welfare of its 
members slightly (after they pay the cost of the sorting) but decreases substan- 
tially the welfare of the rest of society so that net social welfare is reduced. 
In the case of costless sorting, however (and this may be the more common 
case in auto insurance), restrictions on categories will normally reduce welfare. 
The magnitude of this welfare loss is positively related to the level of the pre- 
mium elasticities. In section 3.6 we provide estimates of these elasticities. 
3.5.2  Uninsured Motorists 
The presence of uninsured drivers generates an externality that can be cor- 
rected by  appropriate intervention. To  see this we present here a simplified 
version of  the models of  Keeton and Kwerel (1984) and Smith and Wright 
(1992), in which a competitive market equilibrium with uninsured motorists is 
Pareto dominated by a regulated market with appropriate income transfers. 
Suppose that in a group of drivers the probability of an accident is p and that 
when an accident occurs the total damage in dollars is 2L, L to each driver. 
Suppose that the legal system assigns 100 percent fault to one of  the drivers 
in every accident and that in this case the driver at fault is responsible for the 
total loss (215)  up to the value of initial wealth, W: Assume that the probability 
that any given driver will be involved in an accident in which he is at fault 
is pl2. 
The actuarially fair (collision) insurance premium for each driver is thus 
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p/2 dollars per dollar of insurance. Expected-utility-maximizing drivers with 
sufficient wealth will fully insure by purchasing 2L of collision insurance at 
this premium. If all drivers fully insure, the resulting equilibrium is Pareto ef- 
ficient. 
Suppose, however, that drivers fall into two classes based on initial wealth. 
Assume that q percent of  the population have a level of  initial wealth W,,, 
which is such that it is expected utility maximizing to purchase zero collision 
insurance. Let the remaining 1 -  q percent have a wealth level Whigh,  which is 
such that they fully insure at a fair premium. 
The presence of  uninsured motorists sets up a demand for a new form of 
insurance that pays in the event that a driver is involved in an accident in which 
an uninsured motorist is at fault. Assuming that the probability of an accident 
between an uninsured and an insured motorist only reflects the proportions of 
these two types in the total population, the actuarially fair premium for this 
uninsured motorist coverage is clearly qp/2 per dollar of  insurance. Drivers 
who are rich enough to fully insure will fully insure this risk too, but in this 
case they will buy coverage L, the value of their own loss. 
Market equilibrium in this case has high-income drivers paying a premium 
of pL  for full collision insurance and q(p/2)L  for uninsured motorist insurance, 
and low-income drivers buying zero insurance of either type. 
To generate a Pareto improvement on this equilibrium, suppose we require 
each uninsured driver to buy full collision insurance at a cost of pL. Note that 
if each uninsured motorist were risk neutral, the income transfer necessary to 
compensate for purchasing full collision insurance would be 
The first term in the square bracket is the uninsured motorist’s own expected 
collision loss when the accident is his own fault. The second term is the ex- 
pected loss to an uninsured driver resulting from being in an accident caused 
by another uninsured driver. We  subtract these terms since they are no longer 
borne by an uninsured motorist if he fully insures. 
Now suppose we tax each fully insured motorist q(p/2)L,  the cost of unin- 
sured motorist coverage. Since insured motorists make up 1 -  q percent of the 
population, this tax would enable us to give each uninsured motorist (with 
uninsured motorists making up q percent of the population) an income transfer 
of  (1 -  q)q(p/2)L/q  = (1 -  q)(p/2)L.  As we have just  seen, however, this is 
precisely the amount needed to compensate a risk-neutral uninsured motorist 
for buying full collision coverage. A fortiori, if the uninsured motorist is risk 
averse, we could give him less income and still leave him as well off as when 
he was uninsured. 
Furthermore, once the uninsured motorists buy full coverage there is no rea- 
son for the insured drivers to buy q(p/2)L  of  uninsured motorist insurance. 
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creases the welfare of the poor drivers, so the scheme is Pareto improving.’0 
This, of course, merely demonstrates  the possibility of a welfare improvement. 
Proposition 103 did not require an income transfer from the insured to the 
uninsured. Indeed, the retroactive premium rollback is more directly a transfer 
of income from the stockholders of the insurance companies to those already 
buying insurance. 
To this extent, the price rollbacks of Proposition 103 seem more consistent 
with explanations based on fairness rather than with explanations based on 
efficiency.  Nevertheless, the  possibility  remains  open  to  design  a  cross- 
subsidization scheme that causes all drivers to fully insure, and this would be 
welfare enhancing. In designing such a scheme it is again crucial to know the 
value of the elasticity of demand for insurance. 
3.5.3  Rate Suppression 
In discussing categorization, it was assumed that insurance firms were al- 
lowed to charge whatever premiums they desire for a given category. Only the 
factors available for categorization were regulated. Now we consider matters 
the other way around. We  take as given the available categories but consider 
what happens if regulations impose ceilings on the premiums charged certain 
categories. 
If the industry is competitive,  as we have been assuming, and no restrictions 
are placed on categories, then insurance firms should refuse to write policies 
for categories with suppressed prices. In other words, we should observe that 
policies are granted to all customers in categories where rates are not sup- 
pressed. We  should also observe that policies are granted to no customers in 
categorieb where rates are suppressed. 
The experience in California sheds light on the issue of  rate suppression. 
One of the features of Proposition 103 is that risk rating of bad drivers is to be 
encouraged, suggesting that firms should be able to price this risk fully and 
then provide insurance to these customers. However, many  companies have 
opted not to provide insurance to “unsafe drivers.” This would suggest either 
that the companies believe the premiums for this category are likely to be sup- 
pressed or that they are reluctant to file rates that consumers may  consider 
unfair. 
The experience in Massachusetts also sheds light on the issue of rate sup- 
pression. In Massachusetts, all rates are regulated with an explicit degree of 
tempering. We would expect to find no voluntary policies in the underpriced 
cells and no rejections in the overpriced cells. In fact, as reported by BZ, many 
cells feature partial acceptance and partial rejection. This suggests that firms 
10. Again, note that we are assuming that the probability of an insured motorist’s being in an 
accident with an uninsured motorist reflects only the proportions of the two types of drivers. If 
uninsured motorists have a higher tendency to have accidents with each other, then our conclusion 
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are using factors not included in the standard cell structure, perhaps including 
factors that were otherwise prohibited. 
Rate suppression leads to a form of insurance rationing, comparable in some 
respects to credit rationing in the loan market. Auto insurance, however, is 
mandatory, and therefore the government must ensure that all drivers can ob- 
tain coverage. This creates the assigned risk pools, to which firms send drivers 
whom they have rejected for insurance. 
In many ways, the assigned risk pool represents a very peculiar system. First, 
when assigned risk pool premiums are suppressed, the plan subsidizes the ob- 
jectively worst risks among drivers. What basis can there be for giving this 
group subsidies? Second, when  assigned risk pool  premiums are not  sup- 
pressed, as is increasingly the case, there should be little need for an assigned 
risk pool. In a competitive market, voluntary insurance companies should be 
serving these customers. 
We  might expect rate suppression to create additional effects in terms of 
industry exit. Exit appears to occur only in the most egregious cases, and even 
then in limited amounts; for example, in Massachusetts, BZ report that 18 per- 
cent of  insurance firms left the state. There are reasons, however, why exit may 
not occur, including the expectation that regulation is temporary or that the 
industry is earning quasi rents. 
We might also expect rate suppression to create reductions in quality. Qual- 
ity reductions, however, are not widely evident, perhaps because other factors 
such as reputation, fear of  lawsuits, and expectations that lower quality will 
create further pressure for lower premiums all mitigate the incentive for lower 
quality (see Hanington 1992). 
3.6  Welfare Effects of Auto Insurance: Empirical Evidence 
Rate regulations influence welfare by  distorting the relationship between 
premiums and costs. This causes individuals to drive too much (or too little) 
or to buy too much (or too little) auto insurance. The size of this welfare loss 
depends on two elasticities, the elasticity of demand for automobiles and, given 
that a car has been purchased, the elasticity of demand for insurance. In this 
part, we develop estimates for these elasticities. 
3.6.1  Blackmon and Zeckhauser Estimates 
In some states, the distinction between the drivehot drive decision and the 
insurehot insure decision is of little consequence since the percentage of unin- 
sured motorists is quite small. In Massachusetts, for example, less than 6 per- 
cent of motorists drive uninsured (see table 3.2). Therefore, BZ, in their study 
of the welfare costs of regulation in Massachusetts, calculate the deadweight 
loss by  estimating the demand for insured vehicles. The number of  insured 
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Table 3.2  Percentage of All Vehicles That Are Uninsured (based on uninsured 
motorist claim frequencies for 1985) 































Source: All-Industry Research Advisory Council (1989). 
Table 3.3  Demand for Insured Cars, Blackmon and Zeckhauser Specification 
Equation  State  C  Yh  D  P  R2 
3.1  Massachusetts  .48  -  .04  -  .57  .59 
3.2  California  1.0  .31  .003  -  .63  .26 
(10.8)  (4.0)  (4.8) 
(0.9)  (2.5)  (0.2)  (3.6) 
Sources:  For Massachusetts data sources, see Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1991). For California 
symbol definitions and data sources, see the data appendix. 
Notes: Dependent variable is log (insured cars per household) = log I,,. Estimation is by  ordinary 
least squares:  all variables in log. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics. 
premiums P, and household density D (a measure of congestion costs). The 
observations consist of 294 Massachusetts towns in 1988, with the insurance 
premium measured as the average price of  a standard package of  coverage. 
Their estimated equation using ordinary least squares is shown as equation 
(3.1) in table 3.3. The variables all have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. The insurance premium elasticity of  -0.57  is the key  factor for 
evaluating the welfare consequences of rate regulation. A higher elasticity indi- 
cates that demand for autos is more sensitive to insurance premiums, thus in- 
creasing the deadweight costs of mispricing insurance through rate regulation. 
As already discussed above, BZ find that the deadweight costs based on this 
equation are higher than the risk-sharing or income redistribution benefits that 
rate regulation might confer. 
We  have estimated a comparable equation for California data, where the 
observations consist of 58 California counties in 1990.  The insurance premium 
variable available to us for California is not the same variable used in the Mas- 
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age of coverage, whereas the California insurance premium variable measures 
the average effective premium-the  total auto premiums paid in each county 
divided by the number of insured cars." The estimated equation using ordinary 
least squares is shown as equation (3.2) in table 3.3. 
The California equation confirms the BZ conclusion regarding the insurance 
premium elasticity. Specifically, the insurance premium elasticity is of  the 
same order of  magnitude in California (-0.63)  as in Massachusetts (-0.57), 
suggesting that the deadweight costs of auto premium regulation may also be 
of  the same order of  magnitude in the two states.12  The income elasticity in 
California is lower than in Massachusetts (0.31 vs. 0.48) but remains statisti- 
cally significant. The density variable (congestion cost) in California has an 
unexpected positive sign and is not statistically significant. This difference in 
congestion cost results between California and Massachusetts may depend on, 
among other factors, variations in the supply of public transportation across 
the two states. 
In California, it is not enough to know how premiums affect the demand for 
insurance, because a large fraction of the population of  drivers choose not to 
buy insurance (over 23 percent in 1985 [table 3.21 and over 24 percent in our 
1990 data set). We therefore must estimate separate elasticities for the demand 
for registered cars and the demand for insured cars. To assist in the interpreta- 
tion of these elasticities,  we provide a simple model of driverhnsurance  choice. 
3.6.2  Effects of Insurance Premiums on Uninsured Motorists 
Consider a specific motorist i. There will be a reservation premium Pf be- 
low which the motorist will buy insurance; call this status I. In other words, 
for a given mark& premium P,  if P < PF, then i E  I. The reservation premium 
P$ will vary among drivers, depending on individual characteristics. 
When the market premium P  rises to or above P,?, the motorist will stop 
buying insurance. There are then two choices. He or she may no longer drive; 
call this status W (for walker). Or he or she may drive uninsured; call this status 
U.  The choice between Wand U will be determined by the relative costs of  W 
(the inconvenience of  walking) and  U (the expected costs of  driving unin- 
sured), with individual drivers making different choices depending on their 
circumstances.  However, whatever the choice made at P =  P,?,  the same choice 
will be made at P > PF,  assuming that the factors determining the choice be- 
tween Wand U do not depend on P. 
The demand for insured cars per capita, I, will depend on, among other 
11. The insurance premium data for California counties in 1990 were obtained from the Califor- 
nia Department  of  Insurance. The premiums  include three components,  liability coverage for 
bodily injury and property damage, uninsured motorist coverage, and comprehensive coverage. 
The liability component is a weighted average of the premium paid in the voluntary insurance 
market and for the assigned risk pool. 
12. The slightly higher estimated elasticity in California may arise because insurance premiums 
(California) vary less than standard coverage premiums (Massachusetts). 98  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell 
things, the premium P relative to the distribution of the reservation premiums 
P*  over the population. The higher the market premium P, the lower Z,  since 
more drivers will find that P exceeds their reservation premium. This deter- 
mines the elasticity of  demand for insured cars per capita (variables are all 
in logs): 
(1)  Z=U,,-4P,  q>o. 
A comparable argument holds for the demand for uninsured cars per capita, 
U.  The higher the market insurance premium, the higher the demand for unin- 
sured cars. U will also depend on other factors that determine the choice be- 
tween driving uninsured and not driving at all. The dependence of U on P can 
be written 
(2)  U  = b,,  + b,P,  b,  > 0. 
We should have b, < a,,  since as individuals leave status Z, some enter status U 
but others enter status W 
The total demand for registered cars per capita, R, is identically equal to the 
sum of  Z and U. (In our data set, all cars are assumed to be registered.) The 
relationship between R and the market premium P can then be determined by 
combining equations (1) and (2): 
(3)  R  = I  + U  = (u,, + b,,) - (a, - b,)P = c0 -  c,P,  C,  > 0. 
Thus the registered car premium elasticity c, based on equation (3) should be 
lower than the insured car premium elasticity a,  based on equation (1). 
The total insurance premium P does not take into account the additional 
information provided by the disaggregation of the premium into its component 
parts. Indeed our data set includes three insurance components: liability cover- 
age for bodily injury and property damage P,,  comprehensive coverage Pc, and 
uninsured motorist coverage Pu. For insured drivers, each component should 
have a negative effect on the decision to drive a car, and the liability component 
P,  should be the most important since (1) the risk of loss is greatest for this 
component and (2)  a minimum amount of liability coverage is legally required. 
For uninsured drivers, the liability and comprehensive components should 
also have negative effects on the decision to drive because the premiums are a 
signal of the accident rate in each county and uninsured drivers should respond 
in the same way  as insured drivers since the premiums represent the real risk 
of driving. The uninsured motorist premium, however, has two effects on the 
decision to drive, one positive and one negative. The negative effect arises 
because the uninsured motorist premium is a signal of accident costs just as it 
is for insured drivers. The positive effect arises because the uninsured motorist 
premium represents the expected value of liability claims that are avoided on 
average because uninsured drivers are “judgment proof” (see Shave11 1986). 
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Table 3.4  Demand for Autos and Auto Insurance in California 
Dependent 
Equation  Estimation  Variable  C  Y  T  P  R2 
4.1  TSLS  Registered R  4.8  .5 1 
(4.4)  (6.1) 
4.2  OLS  Insured I  5.1  .59 
(4.1)  (4.9) 
4.3  TSLS  Uninsured U  1.2  .23 
(0.4)  (1.0) 
4.4  TSLS  Log  odds U:  -4.4  -.36 
P  (1.1)  (1.2) 
(1 -  Li) 
-  .04  -.51  .53 
(2.2)  (3.1) 
-.01  -33  .45 
(0.5)  (5.1) 
-.lo  .29  .13 
(2.1)  (0.6) 
-  .09  1.1  .I1 
(1.4)  (1.8) 
Sources: See data appendix for symbol definitions and data sources. 
Note: Observations for 58 California counties in 1990. All variables in log. Numbers in parentheses are 
absolute values of t-statistics. 
uninsured motorist premium on the demand for registered cars should be 
smaller than for the other two insurance components. 
3.6.3  Estimates of the Demand for Registered Cars 
We  now consider empirical estimates of the above model. As the starting 
point, we have made two revisions in the California version of the BZ equation, 
which was shown above as equation (3.2). First, we now use population instead 
of households as the scaling variable for insured cars and income. Population 
data are likely to be more accurate than household data, and there is no obvious 
theoretical basis for preferring households to population as the scaling vari- 
able. Second, we replace the BZ congestion variable D,  which was estimated 
with the wrong sign for California data, with a measure of the percentage of 
the population using public transportation, denoted as T. 
There is potential for simultaneous equation bias in estimating this model 
since registered cars include uninsured cars and larger numbers of uninsured 
cars may  create higher insurance premiums (through the uninsured motorist 
coverage component). To correct for the correlation that might therefore exist 
between the error term and the insurance premium, we have estimated those 
equations in which the dependent variable is the demand for registered cars or 
uninsured cars with two-stage least squares (TSLS). The supply-side variables 
used as instruments include average miles driven per vehicle (MILES), acci- 
dents per capita (ACC), and the population density (D). 
Equation (4.1) in table 3.4 provides empirical estimates of equation (3) for 
the number of  registered cars per capita. The constant, income I: and public 
transportation T terms correspond to the coefficient c,, in equation (3). Com- 
pared with the specification in equation (3.2), the insurance premium elasticity 
(-0.51)  is slightly lower, the income elasticity (0.51) is somewhat higher, and 
the goodness of fit (R2  = .53)  is substantially better. Furthermore, the public 100  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell 
Table 3.5  Correlation Matrix for Insurance Premium Components (58 
California counties in 1990) 
P  P,  P,  P, 
Total premium P  1 .oo  .99  .94  .83 
Liability coverage pL  .99  1  .oo  .92  .I5 
Uninsured motorist pU  .94  .92  1  .oo  .I1 
Comprehensive P,  .83  .75  .I1  1 .oo 
Source: California Department of Insurance. 
transportation variable T, which replaces the density variable D  in equation 
(3.2), is now statistically significant and has the expected negative coefficient, 
indicating that greater use of public transportation reduces the demand for reg- 
istered autos. 
The insurance premium P used in equation (4.1) can be separated into its 
three coverage components,  liability for bodily injury and property damage PL, 
uninsured motorist P,,  and comprehensive Pc. Unfortunately, it proved impos- 
sible to estimate stable effects from the separate components because they are 
extremely highly correlated, as shown by the correlation matrix in table 3.5. 
Consequently, we have been unable to test hypotheses concerning the individ- 
ual premium components. 
3.6.4  Estimates of the Demand for Insured and Uninsured Cars 
We next consider how car owners decide whether to be insured or uninsured 
drivers. We  have carried this out in two forms. First, we have estimated the 
demand for insured and uninsured cars per capita, directly following the theo- 
retical equations (1) and (2). Second, we have estimated the insureduninsured 
decision using a logit estimator. The results are shown in table 3.4. 
Equation (4.2) in table 3.4 provides empirical estimates of the number of 
insured cars per capita I, the empirical version of equation (1) (where the con- 
stant, income I: and public transportation T terms correspond to the coefficient 
a,). The equation is estimated using ordinary least squares because the simulta- 
neity bias is only present when the left-hand-side variable includes uninsured 
drivers. The income elasticity (0.59)  and the insurance premium elasticity 
(-0.83)  are both larger than the corresponding estimates in equation (4.1) for 
registered cars, in accord with the discussion of equations (1) and (3). 
Equation (4.3) in table 3.4 provides empirical estimates of the number of 
uninsured cars per capita U,  the empirical version of equation (2). The number 
of uninsured cars in each California county is computed as the difference be- 
tween the number of  registered cars and the number of  insured camL3  The 
13. This measure will miss uninsured vehicles that are also unregistered. This becomes a serious 
problem, however, only if the percentage of all vehicles that are uninsured and unregistered varies 
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point estimate of the insurance premium elasticity is 0.29; thus, as expected, 
the insurance premium elasticity is positive and smaller than the absolute value 
of the elasticity in equation (4.2) for insured drivers. The estimated coefficient, 
however, is not statistically significant, leaving open the possibility that the 
effect of insurance premiums on uninsured drivers is small or even zero. (In 
contrast, the effect on insured drivers is negative and significant.) 
Since the number of registered cars is identically the sum of insured cars 
and uninsured cars, the premium elasticity in equation (4.1) for registered cars 
is close to the algebraic sum of the elasticities in equations (4.2) for insured 
cars and (4.3) for uninsured cars. If  the estimated equations (4.1), (4.2), and 
(4.3) were linear, instead of log linear, then the elasticity condition would be 
exactly satisfied. 
A logit estimator provides an  alternative functional form in which this add- 
ing up constraint is exactly met (the log-odds specification): 
where p, = U/R  (= the ratio of uninsured cars to registered cars). The estimated 
coefficients using TSLS are shown as equation (4.4) in table 3.4.14 The income 
and public transportation  elasticities are both negative, indicating that counties 
with either higher income or more public transportation have a lower ratio of 
uninsured drivers (although neither coefficient is statistically significant). The 
insurance premium coefficient is positive, large (1. l),  and significant at the 10 
percent level. When this premium coefficient is transformed at the point of the 
sample means to !he  form of an elasticity for the number of uninsured cars per 
capita, the result is 0.33, very close to the directly estimated elasticity of 0.29 
in equation (4.3). Our conclusion is that there is a positive relationship  between 
the level of insurance premiums and the number of uninsured drivers, although 
the moderate statistical significance of the logit estimate and the insignificant 
direct estimate suggest that the point estimate is not well determined.I5 (An 
equivalent equation can be estimated for the log odds of insured drivers, but 
the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients will be identical 
to those in eq. [4.4] with the algebraic signs switched, since the log odds of 
uninsured drivers and the log odds of insured drivers sum identically to zero.) 
3.6.5  Effects of Insurance Premiums on the Assigned Risk Pool 
We next consider how insured car owners decide whether to purchase insur- 
ance through the voluntary market or the assigned risk pool. This decision was 
14. The general conditions discussed in Pindyck and Ruhinfeld (1981, 289-95)  under which 
reliable coefficient estimates of  logit specifications can be obtained without maximum likelihood 
estimators are satisfied in our application. 
15. The number of uninsured motorists is, no doubt, the least accurate of our data. This may be 
the reason for the lack of statistical significance in the insurance premium coefficient here. 102  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell 
Table 3.6  Demand for Insured Autos in  California by Insurance Class 
Dependent 
Equation  Estimation  Variable  c  Y  T  P","  P"  FA  R2 
6.1  OLS  Voluntary 
6.2  OLS  Assigned 
6.3  OLS  Voluntary 
6.4  OLS  Assigned 






V  __ 
(1 -  v) 
6.6  OLS  Log 
odds A: 
(1 -  v) 
V 
~ 
-7.5  .63 
(6.0)  (5.1) 
-9.9  .74 
(2.9)  (2.2) 
-4.8  .54 
(1.8)  (5.1) 
-13.5  .74 
(1.9)  (2.2) 
-2.4  .ll 
(0.8)  (0.4) 
-8.7  .I0 
(1.4)  (0.3) 
-.02  -.72 
(0.8)  (5.8) 
.02  2.3 




.03  3.0 






-34  .42  .51 
(5.0)  (1.5) 
(5.4)  (2.4) 
2.5  -1.9  .78 
36 
3.3  -2.3  .86 
(8.5)  (3.5) 
Sources: See data appendix for symbol definitions and data sources. 
Notes: Observations for 58 California counties in  1990. All variables in log. Numbers in parentheses are  absolute values of 
&statistics. 
particularly important in California in the early 1990s because assigned risk 
pool premiums had been significantly suppressed during the late 1980s, creat- 
ing a situation in which many drivers found the assigned risk pool premium to 
be lower than the corresponding premium in the voluntary market. (This situa- 
tion was later rectified, resulting in a dramatic decline in the size of California's 
assigned risk pool during the early 1990s.) We  thus expect the ratio of  the 
voluntary market premium to the assigned risk premium to have a significant 
effect on the choice of market in which to purchase insurance. 
We  have carried out this estimation in two forms. First, we have estimated 
equations for the per capita number of cars insured through the voluntary mar- 
ket V and through the assigned risk pool A, respectively. Second, we have esti- 
mated the voluntary markedassigned risk pool decision using a logit estimator. 
The results are shown in table 3.6. 
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) show per capita demand estimates for cars with 
voluntary insurance V and assigned risk pool insurance A, where V + A = I 
(total insured cars per capita). The insurance premium PWa  is the ratio of the 
effective voluntary market premium for liability coverage Pv to the effective 
assigned risk pool premium for liability coverage  The income and public 
16. We  could obtain reliable estimates for the effective insurance premiums in the  assigned 
risk pool by  California counties only for bodily injury  and property damage liability coverage. 
Consequently, the premiums P, and PA and their ratio are based only on this component of auto 
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transportation elasticities in both equations parallel the results for total insured 
cars in equation (4.2). The new  factor here is the insurance premium ratio 
Pv,A,  which, as expected, has a large, negative (-0.72), and significant effect on 
voluntary market cars per capita and has a corresponding large positive (2.3) 
and significant effect on assigned risk pool cars per capita. 
Equations (6.3) and (6.4) estimate a similar specification for voluntary mar- 
ket and assigned risk insured cars per capita, respectively, with the insurance 
variables for the voluntary market Pv and assigned risk pool pA treated sepa- 
rately. In both cases, as expected, the own premium has a negative elasticity 
and the cross premium has a positive elasticity. Furthermore, the voluntary 
market premium coefficient is larger in absolute value than the assigned risk 
pool premium coefficient in both equations, indicating that a  1 percent sup- 
pression in both premiums would reduce the assigned risk pool by 0.6  percent 
and increase the voluntary market by  0.4 percent. However, F-tests at the 5 
percent level indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal elastic- 
ities for P,  and pA in both equations (6.3) and (6.4). 
A logit estimator provides an alternative functional form in which to esti- 
mate the choice between voluntary market and assigned risk insurance: 
(5) 
where u  =  A/Z (= the ratio of assigned risk pool cars to total insured cars). The 
estimated coefficients are shown as equation (6.5) in table 3.6. The income 
and public transportation elasticities are relatively small and not significant, 
indicating that these factors do not play an important role in the choice  between 
the two forms of insurance. The insurance premium ratio, however, has a large 
and highly significant coefficient, in line with the results in equations (6.1) to 
(6.4). Equation (6.6) estimates a similar log-odds specification, with the two 
insurance premium terms separated.  As in equations (6.3) and (6.4),  the volun- 
tary market premium pV has a larger effect than the assigned risk pool premium 
4,  but F-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 5 
percent level. In both equations (6.5)  and (6.6),  the implied insurance premium 
elasticities for the number of drivers insured per capita in the voluntary market 
and in the assigned risk pool are very close to the corresponding elasticities in 
equations (6.1) to (6.4). 
3.6.6  Summary of the Effects of Insurance Premiums 
In summary, our estimates for California auto insurance premium elasticit- 
ies, based on a cross section of California’s 58 counties, show large and sig- 
nificant effects along a variety of dimensions. At the most aggregated level, 
equation (4.1) indicates an insurance premium elasticity of -0.5 1 for total reg- 
istered cars. This is very close to the premium elasticity (-0.57)  estimated in 104  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell 
equation (3.1) by BZ for Massachusetts, where they used insured autos as the 
dependent variable. This raises the question of what BZ would have found if 
they had used registered autos, instead of  insured autos, as their dependent 
variable. It seems, however, this would not have changed their results in a sub- 
stantive way because uninsured motorists are not important in Massachusetts 
(see table 3.2). 
In California, it is important to decompose registered cars into insured and 
uninsured cars. For insured cars per capita, equation (4.2)  indicates a premium 
elasticity of -0.83; whereas, for uninsured cars per capita, the estimated elas- 
ticities are positive (0.29  in eq. [4.3] and 0.33 in eq. [4.4]), although of limited 
statistical significance. 
Insured cars in California can be further decomposed into voluntary market 
and assigned risk pool insurance. Using the ratio of the voluntary market pre- 
mium to the assigned risk pool premium, equation (6.1)  indicates an insurance 
premium elasticity of -0.72  for voluntary market insured cars, and equation 
(6.2)  an elasticity of 2.3 for assigned risk pool cars. When the voluntary market 
premium and the assigned risk pool premium are estimated separately, (eqs. 
[6.3] and [6.4]), the voluntary market premium receives a larger coefficient in 
absolute terms, although in each case an F-test fails to reject the null hypothe- 
sis that the two insurance premium coefficients are equal in absolute value. 
These results can be used to evaluate public policies that would suppress 
insurance. One such policy would be to suppress (reduce) both voluntary mar- 
ket and assigned risk pool premiums. As summarized in equations (4.2) to 
(4.4), lower premiums will reduce the number of uninsured drivers per capita 
and raise the number of insured drivers per capita. At the same time, lower 
premiums 'may either leave the mix between voluntary market insurance and 
the assigned risk pool unchanged (eq. 16.51) or create a shift away from the 
assigned risk pool (eq. [6.6]). 
The results can also be used to evaluate public policies in which only one or 
the other of  the insurance premiums is suppressed. Suppressing either pre- 
mium will reduce the number of  uninsured drivers per capita and raise the 
number of insured drivers per capita, with the quantitative effect depending on 
the initial mix between voluntary market and assigned risk pool insurance. At 
the same time, suppressing the voluntary market premium alone will shift the 
mix away from the assigned risk pool, while suppressing the assigned risk pool 
premium alone will shift the mix toward the assigned risk pool. 
The overall implication is that insurance regulation that suppresses premi- 
ums reduces the number of uninsured cars and possibly reduces the number of 
cars in the assigned risk pool. A reduction in the number of uninsured cars can 
be welfare enhancing for two reasons. First, the premiums or costs paid by 
insured motorists for losses created by uninsured motorists will fall. Second, 
those uninsured motorists who become insured motorists enjoy a welfare gain 
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status.17 These benefits could be offset by  a tendency for drivers to take less 
care when they switch from uninsured to insured status, although the evidence 
indicates that uninsured motorists actually have a higher accident frequency 
on average than insured motorists.’*  A reduction in the assigned risk pool may 
be welfare enhancing due to the principal agent inefficiencies that arise in 
such pools. 
Overall, our estimates of the response of uninsured motorists to insurance 
premiums lend support to the view that insurance premium regulation, such as 
contained in Proposition 103, can be welfare enhancing. On the other hand, as 
with all regulation, the resulting deadweight losses have to be weighed against 
the possible benefits. 
3.7  Proposition 103 
We next consider the voting pattern on Proposition 103, the California voter 
referendum creating insurance regulation in California. Three special interest 
groups faced off in the campaign for auto insurance regulation: consumer ac- 
tivists, insurance companies, and trial lawyers. Each group had least one auto 
insurance referendum on the ballot: 
Proposition 100 by the California Trial Lawyers 
Proposition 101 by Coastal Insurance Company 
Proposition 103 by Ralph Nader and Voter Revolt 
Proposition 104 by the insurance industry (to create no-fault) 
Proposition 106 by the insurance industry (to limit legal fees) 
Campaigning for and against these propositions approached an intensity not 
seen since California’s property tax initiative Proposition 13, which had oc- 
curred 10 years earlier. A poll of California attitudes with respect to the insur- 
ance propositions, taken several months before the election (see Field Institute 
1988), asked the following: 
“Overall, do you feel that the amount of money that the average person like 
yourself pays for automobile insurance is much too high, somewhat high or 
about right?’ 
If much too high or somewhat high: “Why do you think rates are so high?’ 
(May indicate more than one category) 
17. The welfare benefits of decreasing the percentage of uninsured motorists are discussed at 
greater length in Smith and Wright (1992). 
18. The statistics  tabulated in Kuan and Peck (1981) found that compared to the average Califor- 
nia driver, the uninsured driver had (1) a much worse prior accident record and (2) a much worse 
prior traffic conviction record. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that driving habits change 
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Table 3.7  Proposition 103 Voting 
Equation  Dependent Variable  C  Y  P  I  R2 
7.1  VOTE 
7.2  VOTE 
~~~  ~~ 
-3.4  .36  .58  .62 
-6.2  .10  .98  .45  .71 
(4.4)  (3.5)  (4.5) 
(6.2)  (0.9)  (6.3)  (3.9) 
7.3  -12.8  .61  1.1 
Log odds VOTE: 
(1 -  T)  (10.3)  (3.7)  (5.0) 
.67 
7.4  -17.1  .22  1.7  .68  .73 
Log odds VOTE: 7 
(1 -  7)  (10.2)  (1.2)  (6.5)  (3.5) 
Sources: See data appendix for variable definitions and data sources. 
Notes: Observations for 58 California counties. Estimation is by  ordinary least squares, all vari- 
ables in log. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of &statistics. 
Auto insurance was thought “much too high” by 77 percent, “somewhat high” 
by  17 percent, and “about right” by only 4 percent. The blame for high insur- 
ance rates was placed on the insurance industry by 45 percent,I9  lawyers or the 
legal system by 36 percent, and California drivers by 38 percent. 
To explore the motives of California voters further, we estimated regression 
equations to explain the voting record on Proposition 103 across California 
counties. In equation (7.1) of  table 3.7, the dependent variable is the log of 
the percentage voting yes (VOTE) on Proposition 103, and the independent 
variables are per capita income (Y)  and the effective insurance premium (P), 
the same’variables  used in equation (4.1). There is a significant and positive 
relationship by county between higher insurance premiums and a yes vote on 
Proposition 103.  The income relationship in equation (7.1), however, may just 
reflect the larger percentage of voters who own cars in high-income counties, 
a relationship already confirmed in equation (4.1). Equation (7.2) verifies this 
hypothesis, since the number of insured cars per capita I is significant while 
income is no longer significant. 
A logit estimator provides an alternative functional form in which to esti- 
mate the voting choice: 
log(L) = a.  + 4Y + q, 
1--7 
where T  = the percentage voting yes. The estimates are shown in equation (7.3) 
in table 3.7 and in equation (7.4) with the number of  insured cars per capita 
added as an additional right-hand-side  variable. The estimated coefficients re- 
19. Specific responses included “Insurance companies are  greedy” (22 percent), “Insurance 
companies are unregulated” (13 percent), and “Insurance companies make too much money” (12 
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flect the same pattern evident in equations (7.1) and (7.2). When the premium 
coefficients are transformed at the point of the sample means to the form of 
an elasticity for the percentage voting yes on Proposition 103, the resulting 
elasticities are 0.63 for equation (7.3) and 0.98 for equation (7.4), both some- 
what higher than the corresponding elasticities estimated in equations (7.1) 
and (7.2). 
These results confirm the importance of high auto insurance premiums as a 
primary determinant of voting yes on Proposition 103. This leaves open, how- 
ever, the question of whether this voting behavior simply reflects self-interest 
(voters in high-premium counties hoped Proposition 103 would lower their 
premiums) or a sentiment of fairness (voters sensed that their premiums were 
unfair relative to some reference standard). The fairness hypothesis receives 
some support from the fact that even in low-premium counties, which stood to 
lose from premium compression, Proposition 103 received a substantial num- 
ber of  yes  votes. On the other hand, Proposition 103 restructured premium 
setting and the administration of premium regulation in a number of other ways 
as well, so even voters in low-premium counties may have expected to receive 
lower premiums as a result of Proposition 103. 
In conclusion, we briefly comment on some of the directly observed effects 
of  Proposition 103 since it was enacted five years ago. In the first place, the 
second tier of risk, the so-called nonstandard insurance contract has been elim- 
inated. The fact that “take all comer” laws eliminate the second tier of contracts 
has been noted in a number of other states, for example, Hawaii, Massachu- 
setts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Carolina (see Sloan and 
Githens 1994). This, of course, raises the question of  what happens to those 
customers who were previously in the second tier. 
Second, although the intent of Proposition 103 was to limit risk classifica- 
tion to the three factors named in the proposition, this has not happened and a 
number of other factors have been approved for use. Among these is zip code, 
though now zip code is used in contiguous clusters, rather than the individual 
zip codes used previously. Obviously, this does not eliminate the possibility 
that by crossing a street one’s insurance rates could double, but it does reduce 
the number of boundaries at which this can occur. 
What has changed, however, is the methodology used to calculate loss rela- 
tives. Insurance companies now estimate loss relatives sequentially, starting 
with a univariate estimation based on the driver’s safety record, then adding 
number of miles driven, and so on. Details of this procedure are sketchy, and 
how this affects premiums in specific cases is not yet known. 
3.8  Conclusions 
We  have confirmed the Blackmon and Zeckhauser result that the demand 
for registered cars is highly premium elastic. In the context of Massachusetts’s 
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losses. In the case of  rate compression, as in California, the high estimated 
premium elasticity also leads to welfare losses, at least when categorization 
is costless. 
We have found evidence of a positive relationship  between insurance premi- 
ums and the number of uninsured drivers. This implies that insurance premium 
regulation, such as Proposition 103, may be welfare enhancing to the extent 
that it causes the percentage of uninsured motorists to decline. There is, how- 
ever, an alternative strategy for lowering the percentage of uninsured motorists: 
the “pay at the pump” initiative that is likely to be forthcoming soon as a Cali- 
fornia referendum proposition. With pay-at-the-pump, insurance premiums are 
collected primarily as fees included in gasoline purchases. Since gasoline is 
needed to drive, pay-at-the-pump eliminates all uninsured motorists. Pay-at- 
the-pump may thus provide the same welfare benefit as suppressed insurance 
premiums in reducing the number of uninsured drivers, but at a lower dead- 
weight cost. 
Our results also point to the potentially important role of  “fairness” with 
regard to insurance premium regulation. References to unfair insurance premi- 
ums were common in the campaign to pass Proposition 103. These references 
to fairness were successful because insurance companies find it difficult to 
document that high premiums reflect high expected costs, especially for driv- 
ers who rarely or never create accidents. It remains unclear, however, whether 
the importance of high insurance premiums as a determinant of  yes votes on 
Proposition 103 reflects simple self-interest or true voter concern for fairness. 
Although we have concentrated here on auto insurance, similar rate regula- 
tion questions arise in other areas of property-casualty  insurance. For example, 
recent attempts by insurance companies to charge higher premiums for hurri- 
cane insurance written on properties with close proximity to the ocean has met 
with strong consumer opposition.  This practice is now widely called “shorelin- 
ing” by obvious analogy with “redlining” in loan markets. Legislation against 
shoreline pricing will have the same effects on the availability of hurricane 
insurance that the legislation against temtory-based pricing has had on the 
availability of auto insurance. 
Earthquake insurance has recently become another area of  major concern 
for casualty insurance companies in California. The Los Angeles (Northridge) 
earthquake  caused these companies and their reinsurance  partners to reevaluate 
the expected costs of such insurance; some companies, in fact, now consider 
earthquake risks uninsurable (see Jaffee and Russell 1997 for details). The 
result is that a quasi-governmental agency has been created-the  California 
Earthquake Authority-at  the request of the insurance companies to provide 
earthquake insurance. It is intriguing that in this case the insurance companies 
have chosen not to provide earthquake insurance because they fear that earth- 
quake insurance  premiums that would be high enough to protect the companies 
financially would be viewed by consumers as unfair. Thus, in this line of busi- 
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contracts at the break-even price, leading to a search for regulatory alternatives 
to the market. 
Data Appendix 
All variables relate to the cross section of  California’s 58 counties and to the 
year 1990, unless otherwise noted. The variables I, R, U,  A, and V are stated 
on a per capita basis; Source of county population data is California Depart- 
ment of Finance (1991). In table 3.3,  all of the variables are stated on a per 
household basis; the number of California households comes from California 













Number of insured cars (per capita, full-year-equivalent policies) 
in the assigned risk pool, from California  Department of Insurance 
California car accidents in 1989, from California Counties Foun- 
dation (1991) 
Constant 
Population/miles2,  from California Department of Finance (  199  1) 
Number  of  insured passenger  vehicles  (per  capita, full-year- 
equivalent policies), from California Department of Insurance 
Annual  miles of  travel  per  vehicle, from California Counties 
Foundation (  199  1) 
Effective  insurance premium,  voluntary  insurance  companies, 
from California Department of Insurance 
Effective insurance premium, assigned risk pool, from California 
Department of Insurance 
Effective insurance premium; weighted  average of  Pv  and  P,, 
where the weights reflect the percentage of  total insured cars in 
each category 
I + U;  includes all registered cars and 68 percent of  registered 
trucks and light commercial vehicles (the percentage used for per- 
sonal purposes) 
Percentage of residents journeying to work by  public transporta- 
tion, by  California metropolitan area, divided into counties for 
1985 (latest year available); counties without any indicated public 
transportation are set equal to the minimum value across the listed 
counties; from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 
State  and  Metropolitan  Area  Data  Book  1986  (Washington, 
D.C., 1986) 
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U 
V 
Number  of  uninsured  vehicles  (per  capita),  from  California 
Department of Insurance 
Number of insured cars (per capita, full-year-equivalent policies) 
in  the voluntary insurance market, from California Department 
of Insurance 
Per capita income, from California Department of Finance (1991) 
Percentage of yes votes on Proposition 103, from California Sec- 
retary of  State (1988) 
Y 
VOTE 
IJ.  UIR 
1,  AN 
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